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ABSTRACT
Empirical studies quantifying the economic eﬀects of increased foreign direct investment
(FDI) have not provided conclusive evidence that they are positive, as theory predicts.
This paper shows that the lack of empirical evidence is consistent with theory if countries
are in transition to FDI openness. Anticipated welfare gains lead to temporary declines in
domestic investment and employment. Also, growth measures miss some intangible FDI,
which is expensed from company proﬁts. The reconciliation of theory and evidence is
accomplished with a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium model parameterized with
data from a sample of 104 countries during 1980–2005. Although no systematic beneﬁts
of FDI openness are found, the model demonstrates that the eventual gains in growth and
welfare can be huge, especially for small countries.
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System.1. Introduction
Theory predicts that the economic e ects in a host country of increased foreign direct
investment (FDI) are positive, but empirical studies have been unable to provide conclusive
evidence consistent with that prediction. For example, Kose, Prasad, Rogo , and Wei’s
(2009) survey of empirical cross-country studies reports that only one ﬁnds a positive
impact of FDI on economic growth.1 Here, I show that these inconclusive ﬁndings do not
contradict theory, but in fact are to be expected when countries are in transition to capital
market openness.
Is h o wt h i sb yc l o s e l ye x a m i n i n gs u c hat r a n s i t i o np e r i o di namulticountry dynamic
general equilibrium model developed in my 2010 work with Prescott. In the model, coun-
tries initially face restrictions on foreign capital investments, both FDI and portfolio, that
are gradually relaxed. As restrictions on FDI are relaxed, foreign multinationals that have
accumulated technology capital—know-how from investmentsi nr e s e a r c ha n dd e v e l o p m e n t
(R&D), brands, and organizations that are not speciﬁc to any one plant—have more oppor-
tunities to use this capital in subsidiaries abroad. As restrictions on portfolio investments
are relaxed, households can borrow and lend to smooth out consumption over time. During
the transition, I ﬁnd that the model predicts per capita GDP and employment initially
both fall below historical trends and do not recover until ther e s t r i c t i o n sa r es u   c i e n t l y
relaxed.
GDP and employment decline for two reasons. One is that when such a relaxation is
expected, households increase consumption and leisure in expectation of higher permanent
income, thereby reducing domestic investment and labor. This income e ect occurs because
relaxed restrictions on future FDI imply a higher e ective level of total factor productivity
(TFP). The other reason for GDP declines is a measurement issue: ﬁrms make intangible
investments that are expensed and thus not part of corporate proﬁts. In the model, there
1 For more details, see their Table 3b.
1are two distinct types of intangible capital: technology capital that can be used in multiple
locations and intangible capital that is plant speciﬁc. Theory predicts that plant-speciﬁc
intangible investments made by the subsidiaries are abnormally high while barriers to FDI
are being removed: that implies a negative correlation between FDI investment and host
country GDP.
But, again, theory also predicts positive e ects in the host country from increased FDI.
GDP and employment eventually rise above trend once the transition period has passed.
And, if there are no constraints on international borrowing and lending, consumption rises
as soon as relaxed restrictions are announced. If there are borrowing constraints that limit
portfolio investments, the rise in consumption is more gradual. But, in either case, welfare
in the host country is higher.
Ii n v e s t i g a t et h et r a n s i t i o np a t ht oF D Io p e n n e s si nt w ov e r s ions of the model: a
simple two-country version and a more realistically parameterized 104-country version.
The simple version of the model allows me to qualitatively describe, fairly precisely,
the transition paths of various economic variables in countries of di erent sizes, where size
is deﬁned by population and level of technology. The transition is deﬁned basically as the
period between the time an announcement is made that FDI restrictions are to be relaxed
at a speciﬁed future date and the time the restrictions are actually relaxed. I consider
equilibrium paths with and without coincident restrictionso np o r t f o l i oi n v e s t m e n t s .T h e
results obtained from the simple model provide some intuition for why empirical ﬁndings
on the impact of FDI may be inconclusive.
The more realistic version allows me, ﬁrst, to conduct the standard empirical analy-
sis of quantifying the impact of FDI on economic growth. Countries are included in the
analysis if they have complete data on inward FDI, net portfolio investment, GDP, and
populations over the period 1980–2005. Observations on inward FDI are used to parame-
terize time paths of country openness parameters, which are policy parameters determining
2the inﬂow of FDI. Observations on net portfolio investment are used to parameterize bor-
rowing constraints on portfolio ﬂows. The model is simulateda n dg r o w t hi nG D Pp e r
capita computed. The result of this 104-country analysis is consistent with that in the
literature. Using standard analysis, the model ﬁnds no evidence of large positive e ects
from FDI. The amount of FDI in a country is not positively correlated with growth in GDP
or TFP and not statistically signiﬁcant in a standard cross-country growth recession.
Yet this same model does predict large positive e ects to FDI openness, in terms
of both growth and welfare. I demonstrate this e ect by conducting a counterfactual
experiment. I recompute equilibria for the 104-country version of the model, relaxing
capital market restrictions almost completely for one country at a time, and estimate per
capita growth in GDP and the welfare gain to each country from doing that. I ﬁnd increases
in annual growth rates in the range of 0 to 7 percentage points and welfare gains that are
equivalent to consumption increases in the range of 4 percentt o4 6 0p e r c e n t .T h eg a i n s
in growth and welfare are both inversely related to country size.
Am e t h o d o l o g i c a lc o n t r i b u t i o no fm yw o r kh e r ei st h ec o m p u t a tion of equilibria in a
dynamic general equilibrium model with a large number of integrated countries. Multi-
nationals in the model choose investments in tangible capital, plant-speciﬁc intangible
capital, and technology capital, both at home and abroad. With many countries and dif-
ferent types of capital, the problem is tractable only if the computations are divided across
parallel processors.2 An initial guess for equilibrium prices and transfers is distributed
across processors, and equilibrium quantities are computeda n dt h e np a s s e db a c kt ot h e
main processor. Prices and transfers are updated, and the algorithm continues until a
ﬁxed point is found.
The main ﬁndings of my analysis rely critically on the existence of intangible capital,
2 For example, in the 104-country version of the model, there are 21,736 di erent capital stocks.
3both technology capital accumulated by multinational parents and plant-speciﬁc intangi-
ble capital used by their foreign subsidiaries. There is a growing body of work concerned
with the measurement of intangible capital. Estimates of investments in intangible capital
by businesses are large, roughly the size of business investments in tangible capital. Many
estimates are based in part on direct evidence of expenditures, for example, R&D expendi-
tures (National Science Foundation, 2012) and advertising expenditures (U.S. Department
of Commerce, 2010). Investments in organization capital aren o tr e a d i l ya v a i l a b l e ,b u t
alternative proxies have been proposed such as executive wages and management consult-
ing fees (Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel, 2005), wages of creative workers (Nakamura, 2003),
and sales, general, and administrative expenses (Lev and Radhakrishnan, 2005). There
are also studies of organizational practices—such as greater use of teams, broader distri-
bution of decision rights, and greater worker training—and their economic impact. For
example, Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Yang (2002) surveyed work practices of large ﬁrms and
found that IT-intensive ﬁrms were more likely to adopt organizational practices and subse-
quent to adoption had higher market valuations and higher outputs than less IT-intensive
ﬁrms. Comprehensive measures of intangible capital are found either by subtracting tan-
gible capital stocks from corporate valuations (Hall, 2000)o rb yi n f e r r i n gm a g n i t u d e s
using neoclassical theory and data from national accounts and tax returns (McGrattan
and Prescott, 2005). Whether the estimates are based on direct measures of (capitalized)
expenditures or indirect measures from theory, the evidences u g g e s t st h a ti n t a n g i b l ea n d
tangible capital stocks in the business sector are of comparable magnitudes.
My work here is related to the literature that quantiﬁes the impact of capital ac-
count liberalization. As noted above, cross-country studies have been unable to provide
conclusive evidence about the positive impact of FDI on economic growth. If all capital
account ﬂows are considered, the results remain inconclusive. (See Kose et al. 2009, Table
3a.) The main positive e ects of ﬁnancial integration have been found for equity market
liberalizations and in certain micro-level studies of FDI. However, according to Kose et
4al. (2009), the positive results for equity market liberalizations are still debatable “because
it is so di cult to disentangle the e ects of the bundled reforms that typically accompany
equity liberalizations.” (See their Table 3c.) In theory, the model used here can be used
to study openness of portfolio equity ﬂows, but the model predictions depend critically
on what is assumed for the path of domestic TFP. The source of positive e ects for the
impact of FDI found in ﬁrm-level studies has been primarily through contacts between
foreign a liates and their local suppliers. (See, for example, Javorcik, 2004.) But, in a
recent survey, G¨ org and Greenaway (2004) claim that empirical support for positive e ects
of FDI based on ﬁrm-level studies is “at best mixed.” These mixed empirical results are
the main motivation for my study.
Most of the theoretical work in the literature examining capital account liberalizations
abstracts from FDI ﬂows, focusing instead on portfolio investment and the integration of
countries with di erent ﬁnancial systems or levels of capital at di erent stages of ﬁnancial
development.3 Here, foreign direct and portfolio investment are both essential: lowering
barriers to FDI increases the e ective production sets for ﬁrms, and lowering barriers to
portfolio investment allows households to better smooth consumption.
More directly relevant is the literature that uses economic theory to quantify the
impact of FDI openness and ﬁnds large output and welfare gains. Burstein and Monge-
Naranjo (2009) estimate the gains of reallocating managerial know-how abroad using a
span-of-control model as in Lucas (1978). Ramondo (2010) estimates the gains of lower
barriers to FDI in a model without trade, but with multinational production. Ramondo
and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare (2010, forthcoming) consider both trade and FDI in the same model.4
The results in these studies are the motivation for the current study, since they all conclude
3 Recent examples include Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006), Caballero, Farhi, and Gourinchas (2008),
Mendoza, Quadrini, and R´ ıos-Rull (2009), and Aoki, Benigno,a n dK i y o t a k i( 2 0 0 9 ) .
4 In McGrattan and Prescott (2009), we concluded that there are large potential gains to FDI openness
based on several numerical examples, but we did not calibrate them o d e lt oa c t u a ld a t a .
5that the output and welfare gains to FDI openness are large, whereas empirical studies
have found little conclusive evidence of positive economic e ects.5
Section 2 lays out the multicountry general equilibrium model used in the analysis.
Section 3 is a set of propositions that qualitatively characterize the transition path in a
two-country version of the model. Section 4 is an applicationo ft h em o d e lt oa c t u a lc r o s s -
country data and therefore quantiﬁes that transition path asw e l la st h eo v e r a l lo u t p u ta n d
welfare gains. Section 5 concludes. Data sources and computational methods are discussed
brieﬂy in the appendices and in more detail in McGrattan (2012).
2. Model
In this section, I describe a multicountry general equilibrium model that builds on Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2009, 2010). I describe ﬁrst the problem solved by multinational
companies and then the problems faced by households. Finally, I deﬁne a competitive
equilibrium for the model economy and describe how to match upn a t i o n a la c c o u n t i n g
statistics with their model counterparts.
2.1. Multinationals















 1  
, (2.1)
with technology capital M
j
t and a composite of country-speciﬁc inputs denoted by Z
j
it.6
The parameter     0g o v e r n st e c h n o l o g yc a p i t a l ’ ss h a r eo fi n c o m e . T e c h n o l o g ycapital
is accumulated know-how from investments in such things as research and development
5 A recent empirical literature has begun to focus on countries that have passed certain thresholds
when relaxing capital restrictions. See, for example, the work of Kose, Prasad, and Taylor (2011).
6 For a micro-foundation of this aggregate production function, see the work of McGrattan and Prescott
(2009).
6(R&D), brands, and organizational capital that can be used ina sm a n yl o c a t i o n sa sﬁ r m s
choose, both at home and abroad. The total number of locationsa v a i l a b l ei nc o u n t r yi in
period t is Nit,a n dﬁ r m st a k et h i sa sg i v e ni ns o l v i n gt h e i ro p t i m i z a t i o np r oblem. Since
technology capital can be used simultaneously in multiple locations, it is not indexed by i.
The span of control of this organizational capital is limitedb e c a u s ec o u n t r i e sa r ea s s u m e d
to have a ﬁxed number of production locations.
Country i’s total factor productivity in t is denoted by Ait.F o rm u l t i n a t i o n a l si n c o r -
porated outside i,t h ee   e c t i v el e v e lo fp r o d u c t i v i t yi ft h e yo p e r a t ei ni is Ai i,w h e r e i
is the degree of openness of country i to FDI. A value of 1 for  i implies that the country
is totally open—or that domestic and foreign ﬁrms have the same opportunities. A value
of less than 1 implies that domestic and foreign ﬁrms are not treated equally by the host
country. In particular, with  i < 1, investment by foreign ﬁrms entails extra costs, and
these costs have the same e ect as if the foreign ﬁrms had lowerT F Pt h a nd o m e s t i cﬁ r m s .
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with inputs of tangible capital K
j
T,i,p l a n t - s p e c i ﬁ ci n t a n g i b l ec a p i t a lK
j
I,i,a n dl a b o rL
j
i.
This speciﬁcation of technology implies that multinationals use two types of intangible
capital, one that is plant-speciﬁc and one that is not.
The stand-in multinational company from country j maximizes the present value of
the stream of after-tax dividends:





where  d is the tax rate on dividends and the sum of dividends across allo p e r a t i o n si na l l
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i =1i fi = j and 0 otherwise,  T is the depreciation rate of tangible capital,
X
j
I,i is investment in plant-speciﬁc intangible capital which is split among the locations in
country i that j operates, and X
j
M is the technology capital investment of multinational j
used in all locations in which j operates.7 The multinational takes as given sequences of
prices pt and wages Wit.T h es a m ew a g er a t ei sp a i db ya l lm u l t i n a t i o n a l so p e r a t i n gi n i.
Dividends for the multinational companies (indexed by j)a r ee q u a lt ow o r l d w i d e
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T,it). Taxable
proﬁts are equal to sales less expenses, where the expenses are wage payments, tangible
depreciation, and expensed investments on plant-speciﬁc intangible capital and technology
capital. Taxable proﬁts in country i are taxed at rate  pi.T h e c a p i t a l s t o c k s o f t h e
multinational in the next period are given by
K
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where  I and  M are depreciation rates of plant-speciﬁc intangible capitala n dt e c h n o l o g y
capital.
2.2. Households
In each period t,h o u s e h o l d si nc o u n t r yi choose how much to consume Cit,h o wm u c h
total labor to supply Lit,a n dh o wm u c ht ob o r r o wf r o ma b r o a d ,Bi,t+1   Bi,t.W i t h o u t
loss of generality, I assume that households in i own all of the equity shares of multina-
tionals incorporated in i;t h u s ,f o r e i g nb o r r o w i n ga n dl e n d i n gr e s i d u a l l yd e t e r m i n etheir
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where     (0,1) is the discount factor,     0i sap r e f e r e n c ep a r a m e t e rg o v e r n i n gd i s u t i l i t y
of labor, and the total population in i is assumed to be proportional to the total number
of locations Nit.W i t h o u t l o s s o f g e n e r a l i t y , I a s s u m e a c o n s t a n t o f p r o p o r t i onality of 1
between the number of people and the number of production locations within a country.
Households take as given the sequence of returns on portfolioi n c o m erbt,w a g er a t e sWit,
prices pt,a n dg o v e r n m e n tt r a n s f e r s it.L a b o ri sn o tm o b i l ea c r o s sc o u n t r i e sb u tc a nb e
supplied to domestic or foreign companies. Taxes are levied on labor at rate  li.8
2.3. Competitive Equilibrium



















Mt} that are consistent
with the maximization problems of multinationals and households. In addition, markets

































These conditions, along with the household budget constraints above, imply that govern-
ment transfers in country i satisfy this:
 it =  liWitLit +  dDi
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8 Since tax rates are constant, here I combine taxes on consumptiona n dl a b o ri n t ot h el a b o rw e d g e
 li.
9Ac r u c i a la s p e c to ft h ec o m p e t i t i v ee q u i l i b r i u mi nt h i sm o d e li st h ea c c u m u l a t i o no f
nonrival technology capital because it plays an important role in determining the ﬂows of
inward and outward FDI. In countries that erect barriers to FDI—those with low values for
 i—investments in technology capital must be made by domestic ﬁrms. If these countries
have, in addition, high TFP or abundant locations, then companies will have incentives to
build up large stocks of technology capital. In the event of a capital liberalization, those
countries that are relatively closed and relatively large—in terms of Ai and Ni—would be
the main suppliers of technology capital via FDI. In contrast, countries that are relatively
open and small with regard to TFP and number of locations wouldt a k ea d v a n t a g eo ft h e
newly accessible stocks of technology capital from abroad and would host the FDI.
2.4. Accounting Measures
Before deriving properties of the competitive equilibrium,In e e dt od e s c r i b eh o wt oc o n -
struct the national accounting statistics for the model. I use accounting measures that are
also used in the empirical studies surveyed by Kose, Prasad, Rogo , and Wei (2009).
Gross domestic product (GDP) for country i in period t is given by





T,it + NXit, (2.8)
where NXi is net exports of goods and services by country i.C o n s u m p t i o na n di n v e s t m e n t
include both private and public expenditures. Intangible investments are expensed and
therefore not included in the measure of GDP. In other words, GDP is not a measure of
total output. GDP is lower because some investments are expensed.
To see this, consider a second way of calculating GDP: namely,t oa d du pa l ld o m e s t i c
incomes. Speciﬁcally, if we sum compensation of households WiLi,t o t a lb e f o r e - t a xp r o ﬁ t s
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10This sum has to be equal to the sum of products in (2.8). From (2.8) and (2.9), it is easy
to calculate net exports as total output produced in country i less the sum of consumption
and all investments.
Next, add ﬂows to and from other countries. Gross national product (GNP) is the
sum of GDP and net factor income from abroad. Net factor receipts (NFR) are the sum
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T,lt} +m a x( rbtBit,0). (2.10)
Analogously, net factor payments (NFP) from i to the rest of the world are the sum of
FDI income of foreign a liates in i sent back to foreign parents and portfolio incomes of
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T,it} +m a x(  rbtBit,0). (2.11)
Adding net factor income to net exports and to GDP gives the current account (CA) and
GNP:
CAit = NXit +N F R it   NFPit (2.12)
GNPit =G D P it +N F R it   NFPit. (2.13)
In the balance of payments, the current account must equal theﬁ n a n c i a la c c o u n t ,
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+( Bit+1   Bit), (2.14)
where the ﬁrst term is net FDI by multinationals from i abroad, the second term is the
(negative) of net new investment by foreigners operating in i,a n dt h et h i r dt e r mi sn e w
9 Equity in overseas operations is categorized as capital from direct investment when the ownership
exceeds 10 percent. Otherwise, it is categorized as capital from portfolio investment.
11portfolio acquisitions by households from i.E m p i r i c a l s t u d i e s r e p o r t r e g r e s s i o n s o f p e r
capita growth of GDP on FDI (or FDI relative to some measure of aggregate output),
controlling for changes in other variables. The right-side variable of those regressions is
the second term of (2.14).
3. A Qualitative Assessment
Now I describe, qualitatively, the equilibrium path of this economy as capital markets
open. In order to make precise predictions about these paths in transition, I consider two
countries, di ering only in size, that agree to open their capital markets to each other at a
prespeciﬁed date in the future. I examine how common measureso fe c o n o m i cp e r f o r m a n c e
change between the time the liberalization is announced through the time it actually
occurs. In order to investigate the relationship between FDIa n dp o r t f o l i oi n v e s t m e n t ,I
also compare a situation in which there are no restrictions onp o r t f o l i oi n v e s t m e n t st oo n e
in which there are restrictions that are relaxed along with FDI restrictions. I ﬁnd that
country size and portfolio investment opportunities strongly a ect the pattern of economic
activity during transition to FDI openness, and I demonstrate that common measures of
economic performance obscure the beneﬁts of FDI openness.
3.1. Additional Assumptions
The propositions below assume that there are two countries ofd i   e r e n ts i z e s ,w h e r es i z e
is deﬁned to be NitA
1  (1   )( T+  I)
it and thus depends on a country i’s population and level
of TFP. Both countries start out closed, and then both announce an FDI openness policy
  
it in t =1 . I nF i g .1 ,Id i s p l a yt h ep a t ho ft h ed e g r e eo fF D Io p e n n e s s{ it},w h i c hi s
assumed to be the same for both countries. After t ,c o m p a n i e sa r ea l l o w e dt op r o d u c ea t
home and abroad.
Ia s s u m et h a tNit = Ni(1 +  N)t and Ait =( 1+ A)t for some ﬁxed Ni and Ai and
12report results relative to historical trends, where  N is the common trend growth rate in
populations and  A is the common trend growth rate in technologies. In other words, I
divide all variables that grow (except labor inputs) by (1 +  Y )t,w h e r e
 Y =( 1+ N)
1 (1  )( T + I)
(1  )(1  T   I) (1 +  A)
1
(1  )(1  T   I)   1.
For labor inputs, I divide by (1 +  N)t.L o w e r c a s el e t t e r sa r eu s e dt od e n o t et h ed e t r e n d e d
variables; for example, cit = Cit/[Ni(1 +  Y )t]a n dlit = Lit/[Ni(1 +  N)t]. Throughout
this section, the historical trend is assumed to be consistent with closed capital markets;
therefore, for the equilibrium described below,  i0 =0a n dBi0 =0 . 10
In order to make precise statements about the equilibrium paths, I make three ad-
ditional assumptions. One concerns the degree of FDI openness: at t = t  +1 ,  
it is
high enough so that the smaller country does not ﬁnd it optimalt om a k ea n yf u r t h e r
expenditures in technology capital in t>t  .A s e c o n d a s s u m p t i o n i s t h a t c o m p a n i e s i n
the smaller country operate only domestically.11 In this case, I need only focus on FDI
ﬂows into the small country. Fig. 2 shows the path of inward FDIo ft h a tc o u n t r y ,w h i c h
peaks at t ,o n ep e r i o db e f o r et h er e s t r i c t i o n sa r ea c t u a l l yr e l a x e d .F or the model, the FDI
investment by multinationals is summarized by the second term in (2.14), which is the net
new investment in tangible capital.
My ﬁnal assumption, which is relevant only for the case without portfolio restrictions,
is to assume that households in the larger country receive an exogenous amount of income,
denoted by  t,b e t w e e nt h ep e r i o d st =1a n dt = t  (which could be positive or negative).
The income stream is such that the interest rate is constant and equal to its historical value
for all periods t =1 ,...,t  .12 In practice, the income needed to ensure a constant interest
rate is tiny, but this assumption lets me make precise statements about a complicated
10 The equilibrium patterns do not change for  i0 > 0a sl o n ga s i0 is below a particular threshold.
11 Relaxing this assumption complicates the mathematics but changes the results only slightly because
the accumulated technology capital of the smaller country is lower than that of the larger country.
12 If  t =0f o ra l lt, then the equilibrium interest rate is nearly constant. For a plot of the interest rates
with and without the income adjustment, see McGrattan (2012).
13dynamic path in an economy that is so close to the economy of interest (with  t =0 )t h a t
the paths cannot be easily distinguished when graphed. I refer to the related economy as
the  -economy.
3.2. Without Portfolio Restrictions
Ib e g i nt h i sq u a l i t a t i v ee x e r c i s eb ye x p l o r i n gw h a th a p p e n sin the two countries when
restrictions on portfolio investments are relaxed immediately, but restrictions on FDI are
relaxed after a prespeciﬁed date t .
Proposition 1.T h es m a l lc o u n t r y ’ so u t p u t ,l a b o r ,a n dc a p i t a ls t o c k si nt h e  -economy
are at or below their historical trends between t =1a n dt = t ,w h e r e a si t sc o n s u m p t i o n
is above trend. The reverse is true for the large country.
Proof.S u p p o s et h a ti nt =1 ,c o n s u m p t i o ncst in the small country, with index i = s,r i s e s
relative to its historical trend, cs1 >c s0.T h e n ,b e t w e e nt =2a n dt = t , cst = cs1 since rbt
is constant by the choice of the { t} adjustment. To be consistent with the intertemporal
condition for asset holdings, this rate of interest has to equal (1+ y)/  1, where  y is the
rate of growth of per capita output,  y =( 1+ Y )/(1 +  N)   1, and   is the household’s
discount factor.











1   lst
,t =1 ,...,t  , (3.1)
where yd
st is the output of domestic companies (indexed by d)i nt h es m a l lc o u n t r y .T h e
ﬁrst equality in (3.1) follows from the assumption that countries are initially closed to
all foreign investment, so all labor is supplied to domestic companies and all output is
produced by them. With capital stocks initially ﬁxed and consumption higher in period
t =1 ,w ek n o wt h a tls1 <l s0 and ys1 <y s0 if (3.1) holds. With capital ﬁxed, we also
know that labor falls by more than output in t =1 .
14In period t =2 ,o u t p u ta n dl a b o rm u s tf a l lf u r t h e rr e l a t i v et ot h eh i s t o r ic trend
because domestic capital stocks fall between the ﬁrst and second periods. To see this, note
that the capital-output ratio is pinned down by the return rbt.I ft h i sr e t u r ni nt h es e c o n d
period is equal to (1+ y)/    1, then the capital-output ratios have to be equal to their
historical levels (in t =0 ) . T h i sf a c tp l u st h ep r o d u c t i o nt e c h n o l o g i e si m p l i e st h a tl a b o r
productivity in the second period must also be at its historical level. Thus, from (3.1), we
know that ys2 <y s1 and ls2 <l s1,s i n c el a b o rp r o d u c t i v i t yi nt h es e c o n dp e r i o di sb e l o w
labor productivity in the ﬁrst.
Since the interest rate does not change between t =2a n dt ,w ek n o wt h a tyst = ys2
and lst = ls2 for t   t .T h i sf o l l o w sf r o mt h ei n t r a t e m p o r a lc o n d i t i o na n dt h ef a c tthat
capital-output ratios and consumptions relative to trend are constant.
The arguments made for the small country can also be made for the large country.
However, because the global resource constraint must hold, the paths relative to trend for
the large country must be reversed. In other words, if consumption for the small country
is above its historical trend from t =1t ot = t ,t h e nc o n s u m p t i o nf o rt h el a r g ec o u n t r y
must be below its historical trend. This follows because output and investment are below
(or above) trend by the same percentage over the period from t =2t ot = t    1, since
capital-output ratios are constant. If consumption in both countries were above trend and
output less investment in both countries below trend, then the global resource constraint
would be violated.
Finally, we can easily show that consumption is initially above trend in the small
country, which is the recipient of future FDI, and initially below trend for the large country,
which is the source of the FDI. This follows from the fact that e ective TFP is higher in
the small country when FDI, and hence foreign technology capital, is allowed in. For the
large country there is no change in e ective TFP because smallc o u n t r yﬁ r m so n l yp r o d u c e
domestically.
15This proof of Proposition 1 is instructive in that it implies speciﬁc patterns for the
key macroeconomic aggregates in the transition period between the announcement and the
enactment of the policy to relax restrictions on FDI. Fig. 3 shows the equilibrium paths for
consumption, output, and labor in the small country (left panels) and the large country
(right panels). The scale of the ﬁgures in the left panels of Fig. 3 are comparable to those
in the right panels, indicating that the relaxed FDI restrictions have a relatively larger
impact on the small country.
Fig. 3 shows that consumption in the small country rises abovei t sh i s t o r i c a lt r e n d
at the announcement of the new policy, stays on a new higher trend until the restrictions
are actually relaxed, and then rises further after t  when the interest rate is no longer
constant. At the same time, consumption in the large country is below its historical
trend, but ultimately rises above trend as global productione x p a n d s ;a f t e rt = t ,t h e
multinationals in the large country are able to produce at home and abroad.
Equilibrium paths for output and labor relative to their historical trends are shown
in the bottom half of Fig .3. I put output and labor on the same graph in order to show
that in the period from t =2t ot = t ,t h e ya r eb e l o wt r e n db yt h es a m ep e r c e n t a g e .
When restrictions are relaxed, output in the small country rises relatively more than labor
because TFP and capital are both higher. As with consumption,Iﬁ n dt h a to u t p u ta n d
labor in the large country, which by assumption has no inward FDI, is little changed.
Equilibrium paths for the capital stocks are shown in the top half of Fig. 4. The
domestic capital stocks fall for one period after the announcement and then remain ﬂat
until the policy is actually enacted. After t =1a n db e f o r et h ep o l i c yg o e si n t oe   e c t ,
capital-output ratios and labor productivity remain at their historical trends. When the
policy is changed, investment in the technology capital of domestic companies ceases. At
this point, the optimal policy is to leave it to foreign multinationals to invest in technology
16capital. Total tangible and plant-speciﬁc intangible capital stocks rise and remain high
because foreign companies are now investing in the small country.
With multinationals investing in intangible capital, output (shown in Fig. 3) is not
equal to GDP or GNP, which are typical measures of economic performance used in cross-
country empirical studies. The following proposition qualiﬁes the equilibrium paths of
these series in the transition.
Proposition 2.T h es m a l lc o u n t r y ’ sG D Pa n dG N Pi nt h e -economy initially, after the
announcement, rise above their historical trends and then fall below trend between t =2
and t = t .T h er e v e r s ei st r u ef o rt h el a r g ec o u n t r y .
Proof.R e c a l l t h e d e ﬁ n i t i o n s o f G D P a n d G N P i n ( 2 .9) and (2.13). In the ﬁrst period,
when the policy is announced, net factor incomes for the period are already determined;
therefore, GNP must equal GDP. To show that both are above their historical trends in the
small country in t =1 ,Im u s ts h o wt h a ti n t a n g i b l ei n v e s t m e n t so fd o m e s t i cﬁ r m s(indexed
by d)i nt h es m a l lc o u n t r y( i n d e x e db ys)f a l lb ym o r et h a no u t p u t ,s i n c eG D Pi sd e ﬁ n e d
as output less the sum of investment in plant-speciﬁc intangible capital and technology
capital. This is shown as follows:
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where the ﬁrst equality uses the capital accumulation equation after detrending all vari-
ables, the second equality follows from the fact that the capital-output ratio in the second
period is equal to the historical capital-output ratio, and the inequality follows from Propo-
sition 1. Since  I   1, plant-speciﬁc intangible investment must fall by more than output.
17The same argument can be made for technology capital. Therefore, GDP and GNP are
both above trend in t =1 .
In the second period, since the capital-output ratios are at their historical trends,
GDP in the small country must be below its own trend by the same amount as output.
In t = t ,G D Pf a l l sf u r t h e rb e l o wi t sh i s t o r i c a lt r e n dt h a no u t p u th a sf a l l e nb e c a u s e
investment of foreign multinationals in both tangible and plant-speciﬁc intangible capital
rises above zero. GDP is lower because of the rise in plant-speciﬁc intangible investment.
The path of GNP depends on the path of portfolio investment from abroad. Since
there are no portfolio restrictions, the small country borrows as soon as the policy change
is announced and must make bond repayments thereafter. Thus,G N Pi sa b o v eG D Pi n
t =2a n db e l o wi nt =3 ,...,t     1, with the di erence between GNP and GDP equal to
the interest payments rbtbit.
In the transition period, the pattern of debt can be determined from net exports
which are equal to the change in debt holdings less interest payments. Net exports are
equal to GDP less domestic consumption and investment—and all three of these variables
are constant relative to their historical trends between t =2a n dt = t    1. Thus, net
exports must also be constant relative to its historical trend.
The arguments made for the small country can also be made for the large country,
but the direction of change is reversed for the periods t =1t ot = t .
The bottom half of Fig. 4 shows the equilibrium paths for GDP and GNP. As the
propositions above show, both GDP and GNP in the small countrya r ea b o v et r e n di n i t i a l l y .
But in t =2 ,s m a l lc o u n t r yG D Ph a sd r o p p e db e l o wt r e n db yt h es a m ea m o u nt as true
output and stays constant relative to that historical trend until intangible investment
by foreign multinationals rises signiﬁcantly. GNP falls throughout the preliberalization
period because the small country is paying portfolio income to households abroad. The
18large country paths are shown for comparison; as in the case ofo u t p u ta n dl a b o r ,t h e r ei s
as m a l l e ri m p a c to fF D Io p e n n e s si nt h el a r g ec o u n t r y .
Ac o m p a r i s o no fF i g .2a n dt h eb o t t o ml e f tp a n e lo fF i g .4c l e a r ly illustrates one of
the main messages of the paper, namely, that when foreign direct investment is high, GDP
is low. The reason is simple: FDI is high because foreign tangible investment is high, GDP
is low because foreign plant-speciﬁc intangible investmenti sh i g h ,a n db o t hi n v e s t m e n t s
are high when countries are open to FDI. After liberalization, GDP in the small country
is above its historical trend because it exploits the technology capital of the large country.
If there is a reversal of policy after t ,t h es m a l lc o u n t r yw o u l dh a v et or e b u i l di t so w n
technology capital, which is costly. Furthermore, the intangible investments that they
would have to make would result in low measured proﬁts and, thus, low national income.
The rise in consumption and leisure in the small country hosting the new FDI is
indicative of a positive welfare gain to openness, if the welfare gain is measured as the
consumption increase necessary to keep the small country indi erent between remaining
closed and being open. Assuming that countries have good measures of consumption, this
suggests that empirical studies could use this alternative measure of economic performance
instead of the ones typically used, namely, per capita GDP or GNP. I will show next that
the usefulness of consumption as a proxy for economic gains depends on whether there are
restrictions on portfolio investments. So far, I have assumed that there are no restrictions.
3.3. With Portfolio Restrictions
Now I consider what happens if restrictions on portfolio and foreign direct investments are
relaxed together. In this case, Bi,t+1 =0 ,f o rb o t hi and t =1 ,...,t  .W i t h it =0o v e r
the same period, the two economies are initially e ectively closed, and the only changes in
the time series are due to the anticipation of a future relaxation of the capital accounts.
Proposition 3.T h es m a l lc o u n t r y ’ so u t p u ta n dl a b o rw i t hf u l lc a p i t a la c c o unt restrictions
19are below their historical trend between t =1a n dt = t .T h er e v e r s ei st r u ef o rt h el a r g e
country.
Proof.I f ,i np e r i o dt =1 ,c o n s u m p t i o ni nt h es m a l lc o u n t r yr i s e sr e l a t i v et oi t sh i storical
trend, cs1 >c s0,t h e nt h ei n t r a t e m p o r a lﬁ r s t - o r d e rc o n d i t i o no fh o u s e h o l d si n( 3 .1) implies
that labor and output fall initially. With capital ﬁxed, labor falls more than output.
With no borrowing or lending allowed across countries, totali n v e s t m e n ti np e r i o d
t =1 ,ys1   cs1,m u s tb eb e l o wt r e n d .W i t hr e t u r n se q u a t e da c r o s sa s s e t s ,i n vestment in
all three types of assets—tangible capital, plant-speciﬁc intangible capital, and technology
capital—must also be below trend.
In period t =2 ,o u t p u ta n dl a b o rm u s tf a l lf u r t h e rb e c a u s ed o m e s t i cc a p i tal stocks
are lower between the ﬁrst and second periods when investmenti nt =1i sb e l o wt r e n d .
Households cannot borrow from abroad; thus, output, investment, and labor continue to
fall until t = t ,a n dn e te x p o r t sr e m a i ne q u a lt oz e r ou n t i lt h er e s t r i c t i o n son FDI are
relaxed.
Again, the same arguments can be made for the large country, but because the global
resource constraint must hold, the paths relative to trend for the large country must be
reversed. Because the small country is the recipient of future FDI while the large country
is its source, the initial consumption in the small country must be above its historical
trend, and the initial consumption in the large country must be below. Otherwise, the
global resource constraint would be violated.
3.4. A Comparison
The two situations, with and without portfolio restrictions, are compared in Fig. 5. Clearly,
the ability to borrow from abroad a ects both an economy’s transition to FDI openness
and its future levels of activity. Without this ability, the adjustments are slow before
t = t ,b u tr a p i dw h e nr e s t r i c t i o n so nc a p i t a la c c o u n t sa r er e l a x e d.
20If portfolio investments are restricted, the economic beneﬁts of the new policy are
not easily detectable—either in terms of improved consumption and welfare or in terms
of improved production and employment—until after a threshold degree of openness has
been reached.
The results in Figs. 3–5 shed light on the central puzzle. According to standard
neoclassical theory, countries with faster productivity growth should attract more foreign
capital, but observed capital ﬂows are not consistent with this prediction. Empirical studies
ﬁnd that countries with lower GDP and TFP growth receive most of the capital inﬂows.
In the simple two-country version of the model with countriesd i   e r i n gi ns i z e ,Iﬁ n dt h i s









where KT,it is the total tangible capital in country i.A s i n t h e c a s e o f G D P , m e a s u r e d
TFP is abnormally low when inward FDI is abnormally high. Thisi st r u ee v e ni ft r u e
TFP does not change. Thus, care must be taken when diagnosing economies with low or
slow-growing GDP and TFP.
In McGrattan (2012), I show how the results change as I vary thel e n g t ho ft h et r a n s i -
tion to openness—the time delay between policy announcementa n dp o l i c ye n a c t m e n t — t h e
relative sizes of countries, the maximal degree of openness,a n dt h es h a r eo fi n c o m et h a t
goes to technology capital. The qualitative features shown in Figs. 3–5 are not altered.
4. A Quantitative Assessment
Next, I consider more realistic choices for the time paths governing the relative size and
degrees of openness in the world economy and the number of countries. I enlarge the
model to a 104-country version parameterized with data from the World Bank’s World
21Development Indicators (WDI), for the period 1980–2005.13 After demonstrating that the
model generates empirically consistent employment shares of a liates at home and abroad,
Is i m u l a t et r a n s i t i o np a t h sa n dg e tar e s u l tl i k et h o s eo fm a n yo t h e rs t u d i e s :n os y s t e m a t i c
pattern between the degree of FDI openness and the level of economic growth predicted by
the model.14 Going beyond other studies, I also estimate the growth impacta n dw e l f a r e
gains, for each country in the sample, when I unilaterally relax capital market restrictions.
Iﬁ n dt h a tt h eb o o s tt oa n n u a lp e rc a p i t aG D Pg r o w t ho v e rt h ep e riod 1980–2005 is large,
as much as 7 percentage points. I ﬁnd that the welfare gains area l s ol a r g e ,a sm u c ha s
460 percent in consumption-equivalent units. Both e ects are inversely related to country
size.
4.1. Model Speciﬁcations
Inputs in the larger version of the model are chosen so that it generates trends in inward
FDI to GDP that mimic the trends in the data. Because the focus is on trends, a period is
deﬁned as ﬁve years. The choice of 104 countries is dictated byd a t aa v a i l a b i l i t yo ni n w a r d
FDI, net portfolio investment, GDP, and population. I assumet h a tc o u n t r i e sh a v ef o u r
di erences: (1) relative technology levels Ai,w h i c hIa s s u m ea r eo nt r e n da n dc h o s e ns o
that real GDP per capita in 1980 is the same in the model and the data; (2) populations
Nit,w h i c ha r et a k e nd i r e c t l yf r o mt h eW D Id a t a ;( 3 )d e g r e e so fF D Io p e n n e s s it,w h i c h
are chosen so that the ratio of inward FDI to GDP in the model hast h es a m et r e n da s
am o v i n ga v e r a g eo ft h ea c t u a ls e r i e s ;a n d( 4 )t h en u m b e ro fp e riods that international
13 For data sources, see Appendix A. See Appendix B and McGrattan (2012) for details on the compu-
tational methods. Note that in the 104-country version of the model, I allow for small quadratic costs
of adjusting capital stocks. This approach avoids numerical di culties due to binding nonnegativity
constraints on investments.
14 Many factors are left out of the analysis here in order to highlight the impact of relaxing capital
market restrictions on economic performance. Sensitivity analysis in McGrattan (2012) shows that
the main results are not overturned if changes in other factors are included.
22borrowing Bit is held at zero, which I denote as Tc and set by comparing net portfolio
investments in the model and the data.15
The implied productivities, Ai,a n dt h ep a t hf o rp o p u l a t i o n s ,Nit,a tﬁ v e - y e a ri n t e r v a l s
are reported in Table 1 for all countries i in the sample (along with the country codes
used in the following ﬁgures). All estimates are relative to the United States, which is
normalized to be 100. After 2005, I assume that the populations relative to that of the
United States stay at their 2005 level. As the values in the table indicate, the dispersion
in country relative size is large, which is not surprising given the wide range of TFPs and
populations.
The path of the degree of openness,  it,i sr e p o r t e di nT a b l e2f o ra l lc o u n t r i e si along
with the number of periods during which international borrowing is held at zero. For many
of the countries, using a step function for the sequence  it generates a realistic level and
time series path for the ratio of FDI to GDP. Thus, the time pathu s e di nt h et w o - c o u n t r y
example is not atypical.16
For all other parameters, I use estimates from my 2010 study with Prescott of the
U.S. current account, which are listed in Table 3.17 To ensure that none of the results rest
critically on any of these choices, I have also done an extensive sensitivity analysis. (See
McGrattan, 2012.)
In Appendix B and McGrattan (2012), I provide details on the ﬁrst-order conditions
of the maximization problems and the methods used for computing equilibria in this model
with many states. The main innovation here is the use of parallel processors, one for each
country.
15 As before, measured TFPs are time varying, since they depend on thet i m ep a t h so fp o p u l a t i o na n d
technology capital.
16 Codes are available at my website for generating all inputs and outputs of the model.
17 Averages are used for time-varying tax rates.
234.2. Implications for Employment Shares
Before turning to the main quantitative result, I ﬁrst check to see if it generates realistic
employment shares between domestic and foreign ﬁrms. I do this because I have abstracted
from many factors that di erentiate countries, most importantly for the purposes here,
their geography, language, and trade policies, which potentially a ect these shares. I ﬁnd
that despite those abstractions, the model’s employment predictions are quite good.
In Figs. 6–8, I show evidence from three sources: the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) statistics on inward activity of multinationals and
employment (OECD, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), the survey of foreign a liates in the United
States from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) (U.S. Department of Commerce,
2007), and the BEA’s survey of U.S. a liates abroad (U.S. Department of Commerce,
2008). I use data on manufacturing employment, since that measure is available and most
relevant; service industries have been a much smaller share of multinational operations to
date.
Fig. 6 compares for each country the predicted and actual employment under foreign
control as a share of the country’s total employment. Data area v a i l a b l ef o r1 7O E C D
countries. The graph shows that the model does well along thisd i m e n s i o n :t h ec o r r e l a t i o n
between the predicted and actual shares is 0.82.
Fig. 7 compares the predicted and actual employment of foreign a liates in the United
States by country of origin. The countries in the ﬁgure cover 88 percent of all foreign
employment in U.S. manufacturing. In the model, these same countries cover 86 percent
of all foreign employment in the United States. The correlation between the predicted and
actual shares is 0.80.
Fig. 8 compares the predicted and actual employment of U.S. a liates abroad relative
to employment in the host country. The model underpredicts employment shares in Canada
and Ireland, but does a reasonably good job given that geography, language, and trade
24agreements are not modeled. The model overpredicts the employment share of Belgium-
Luxembourg, a country with few people but a high inward FDI to GDP ratio. Despite
these deviations, the correlation between the predicted anda c t u a ls h a r e si ss t i l lh i g ha t
0.68.
Overall, the predicted and actual employment shares match upw e l l .
4.3. Current Predictions
Since the parameterized model does well in predicting employment shares, we can expect
other predictions related to foreign investment to be at least reasonable. For the central
issue here—the relationship between FDI openness and growth—the model predicts an
economically insigniﬁcant relationship, as many empiricals t u d i e sh a v ef o u n d .
Fig. 9 is the analogue of Lucas’s (2009) Fig. 2, which comparesc o u n t r i e sd o i n gal i t t l e
and a lot of trade. Here, I distinguish instead between countries doing a little or a lot of
inward FDI. The x-axis of Fig. 9 shows the initial real GDP per capita relative to the level
of the country parameterized to match U.S. observations. The y-axis is the annual growth
rate in real GDP per capita over the period 1980–2005. This rate is relative to the growth
rate of the country parameterized to match U.S. observations. Thus, an annual growth
rate of zero implies that a country is growing at the same rate as the country matched to
the United States. Rates above zero imply that the country is catching up to the U.S. level
of per capita GDP, and rates below zero imply that it is fallingb e h i n d .Iu s eac u t o  f o r
the average FDI to GDP of 1.8 percent and identify only countries that are above it, which
is half of the sample. Other cuto s for FDI could be used, and I could replace growth in
GDP by growth in TFP, but the message would be the same: the datas h o wn oo b v i o u s
relationship between capital restrictions and economic performance.
Another way to demonstrate this result is by way of a cross-country regression of
25growth on initial per capita GDP and the ratio of FDI to GDP.18 In Table 4, I report the
results of such a regression for both the data and the model. The coe cient of interest is
a2.T h i sc o e   c i e n ti s0 . 0 5 2i nt h ed a t a ,b u ti sn o ts i g n i ﬁ c a n t l ydi erent from zero. In the
model, the estimate is 0.046 with a standard error smaller than that in the data, but it is
not economically signiﬁcant. If I double the FDI to GDP ratio from 2 percent (which is
close to the median in my sample) to 4 percent, the predicted change in the growth rate
for real GDP per capita relative to the U.S. growth rate remains less than 0.1 percentage
point.19
4.4. Potential Gains
The lack of a robust and economically signiﬁcant relationship between FDI openness and
growth does not necessarily mean that the e ects of FDI openness are not positive and
large. To demonstrate, I compute the economic impact of relaxing capital market restric-
tions almost completely for one country at a time. I estimate the beneﬁts in terms of higher
GDP growth and welfare and ﬁnd that they can be huge, especially for small countries.
More speciﬁcally, I run the following counterfactual experiment: for each country i,
Ii n c r e a s et h e{ it} to 0.95 for all periods after 1980, and I remove all restrictions on
portfolio investments. This choice is above the maximum value for the benchmark model,
which is 0.92 in the case of Singapore, and a realistic upper bound since most countries
have policies forbidding foreign investment in industries that are crucial for the military
and national security.20 In each case, I calculate the growth in per capita GDP less the
growth rate computed in the benchmark model and the consumption-equivalent gain, that
18 Many of the studies surveyed by Kose, Prasad, Rogo , and Wei (2009) include other control variables
about which the model is silent. But researchers have found that adding them reduces the already
small coe cients on the ratio of FDI to GDP.
19 In McGrattan (2012), I analyze variations on the growth regressions h o w ni nT a b l e4 .I na l lc a s e s ,I
ﬁnd that the predicted change in the growth rate is economically insigniﬁcant.
20 I cannot raise  it to 1 for two reasons. First, at 1, there is an indeterminacy in terms of who should
produce technology capital. Second, it is di cult numerically to raise  it much higher than 0.95 with
many countries near corners in terms of investment.
26is, the increase in consumption needed to keep the country indi erent between the old and
new policy.
Fig. 10 shows the prediction for GDP growth when countries arec l o s et oc o m p l e t e l y
open relative to that of the benchmark parameterization.21 The di erences in the predicted
growth rates are plotted relative to country size (in log scale). As expected from the earlier
propositions, there is an inverse relationship between a host country’s growth following
capital market liberalization and its relative size. In almost all cases, the boost in growth
in transition is substantial, with the highest annual estimates around 7 percentage points.22
Fig. 11 shows the predicted welfare gains for each country unilaterally opening their
capital markets. As with growth, there is an inverse relationship between gains and the
country’s relative size, which is close to linear in logarithms. The smallest potential gain
is found for the United States, at a 4 percent increase in consumption, and the largest
gain for the Solomon Islands, at a 460 percent increase. If we compare two countries close
to the best-ﬁt line in Fig. 11—say, Great Britain and Botswana—we ﬁnd that a country
smaller by a factor of 300 has a welfare gain that is 11 to 12 times larger. In other words,
for small countries, the potential gains to openness are huge.23
5. Conclusion
Here, I have studied the equilibrium paths of a multicountry dynamic general equilibrium
model as countries relax restrictions on portfolio and foreign direct investment. By taking
account of a transition period, the model reconciles theoretical claims that allowing FDI
leads to higher growth and welfare for host countries with thel a c ko fr o b u s te m p i r i c a l
21 Numerical values for the results in Figs. 10 and 11 are reported in Table 2 in McGrattan (2012).
22 As in the basic neoclassical growth model, increased growth rates in my model are temporary as
countries catch up. See Henry (2007).
23 The inverse relation between gains and size is also found in work by Ramondo and Rodr´ ıguez-Clare
(forthcoming), who estimate the gains of moving from autarky to current-day capital and current
account restrictions for 19 OECD countries.
27evidence for such beneﬁts. In the model, beneﬁts to FDI openness are large, but not until
some threshold of openness is reached.
This result implies at least two research challenges. More work is required to delineate
the characteristics of the openness threshold. And the standard method of analyzing the
e ects of FDI openness must be abandoned. After all, even using the method here, on the
data generated by my model, results in the mistaken conclusion that relaxing restrictions
on capital movements is not beneﬁcial to the host country.
28Appendix A. Data Sources
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators is the source of individual-country data
used in this study. All countries with complete time series for the period 1980–2005 are
included.24 (The complete list of countries is shown in Tables 1 and 2.) Speciﬁcally, I
construct the ratio of inward FDI relative to GDP and real GDP per capita using the
following variables (with WDI codes in parentheses):
• Foreign direct investment, net inﬂows, in current U.S. dollars (BX.KLT.DINV.CD.WD);
• Portfolio investment in current U.S. dollars (BN.KLT.PTXL.CD);
• GDP in current U.S. dollars (NY.GDP.MKTP.CD);
• GDP in constant 2000 U.S. dollars (NY.GDP.MKTP.KD);
• Total population (SP.POP.TOTL).
The OECD and the BEA are the sources of data used to construct employment shares of
foreign a liates shown in Figs. 6–8. Speciﬁcally, I use the following:
• Fig. 6: OECD.Stat Inward activity of multinationals (and, asas u p p l e m e n t a r ys o u r c e ,
the OECD Factbook 2010);
• Fig. 7: FDIUS Establishment Data for 2002, Table A1.9, has employment of foreign-
owned establishments in the United States by country;
• Fig. 8: USDIA 2004 Final Benchmark Data, Table I.H3, has employment of a li-
ates, and the OECD STAN database for Structural Analysis has total manufacturing
employment in the host country.
24 See McGrattan (2012) for results based on a subsample of the 104 countries, namely, those with
complete inward FDI data (variable 4555) for the period 1980–2005 in the International Monetary
Fund’s Balance of Payments (IMF, 1980–2010).
29Appendix B. Computational Methods
Here, I brieﬂy describe the two main numerical issues that arise in computing equilibria
for the 104-country version of the model: the large dimensionality of the state space and
the nonnegativity constraint on investment decisions.25
The issue of dimensionality arises because the investment decisions of ﬁrms in one
country a ect decisions in all other countries. To handle this issue, I used a parallel
computer and a code that uses the message passing interface (MPI). An initial guess is made
for the vector of interest rates, wages in all countries, and transfers in all countries. If there
are I countries and T time periods, a ﬁxed point must be found for (2I+1)T  1p r i c e sa n d
transfers. The guess is distributed by the master processor to all slave processors. Given
prices and transfers, equilibrium quantities are computed on the slave processors, passed
back to the master, and the guess for the prices and transfers is updated. A ﬁxed point
in quantities must also be solved at each iteration. This is done with a standard Newton
method, although I have found that analytical derivatives oft h eJ a c o b i a n sa r en e c e s s a r yt o
avoid very slow computations given the large number of unknowns being computed. A ﬁxed
point must be found for (2I +4 ) T quantities that include consumptions, labor supplies,
bond holdings, investments in technology capital, I investments in tangible capital, and I
investments in plant-speciﬁc intangible capital for each period. In all, (4I +5)T  1p r i c e s
and quantities are computed.
The other issue is, again, the nonnegativity of investment decisions. As small countries
relax capital restrictions and let technology capital ﬂow inf r o ma b r o a d ,t h er e t u r n st o
investing in their own technology capital fall—possibly nonmonotonically, but ultimately to
zero. With a large number of countries in the model, it is di cult to apply standard penalty
function methods to avoid negative investments. Instead, I allow for (small) quadratic
adjustment costs in the accumulation equations (2.5)–(2.7) to aid the solution of the ﬁxed
points in prices and quantities. For countries that are closet ot h ec o r n e ra tt h es t a r to f
the simulation (which is matched up to 1980 observations), I assume that they are at the
corner and set the appropriate investments to zero.
25 For full details of the methods used and equations solved, see McGrattan (2012).
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Figure 1. Degree of Openness for Both Countries over Time
in the Two-Country Model
Figure 2. Inward FDI of the Small Country over Time
in the Two-Country Model















Figure 3. Detrended Consumption, Output, and Labor over Time
      in the Two-Country Model without Portfolio Restrictions
                               (initial steady state = 100)





















Figure 4. Detrended Capital Stocks, GDP, and GNP over Time
      in the Two-Country Model without Portfolio Restrictions
                            (initial steady state = 100)

























     Figure 5. A Comparison of Detrended Consumption and GDP 
 with and without Portfolio Restrictions in the Two-Country Model
































Figure 6. Predicted vs. Actual Share of Each Country’s
Total Employment Controlled by Foreign Firms
























































Figure 7. Predicted vs. Actual Share of Total U.S. Employment
in Foreign Controlled Establishments by Country
































Figure 8. Predicted vs. Actual Share of Each Country’s Total
Employment Controlled by U.S. Firms




































































































Figure 9. 1980 Real GDP and Predicted Growth Rates, 104 Countries
(Countries with average FDI/GDP > 1.8% labeled)































































































































Figure 10. Predicted Change in Relative Growth of Unilaterally
Opening to FDI and Portfolio Investment, by Country
(Degree of openness increased to 0.95 after 1980 and portfolio restrictions removed)







































































































Figure 11. Predicted Welfare Gains of Unilaterally Opening to
FDI and Portfolio Investment, by Country
(Degree of openness increased to 0.95 after 1980 and portfolio restrictions removed)
43Table 1. TFP and Population Inputs, 104-Country Model, USA = 100
AN 1980 N1985 N1990 N1995 N2000 N2005
North & Central America
United States (USA) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Canada (CAN) 93.5 10.8 10.9 11.1 11.0 10.9 10.9
Costa Rica (CRI) 38.4 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
Dominican Republic (DOM) 23.7 2.5 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2
El Salvador (SLV) 29.3 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.1 2.0
Guatemala (GTM) 22.9 3.0 3.3 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.3
Honduras (HND) 18.9 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
Mexico (MEX) 38.4 28.8 31.7 33.3 34.2 34.7 34.9
Panama (PAN) 38.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1
Europe
Austria (AUT) 98.7 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.8 2.8
Belgium-Luxembourg (BEL) 94.4 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.7
Cyprus (CYP) 54.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Denmark (DNK) 119 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
Finland (FIN) 97.7 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8
France (FRA) 86.5 24.0 23.2 22.7 21.7 20.9 20.6
Germany (DEU) 83.1 35.1 32.7 31.8 30.7 29.1 27.9
Iceland (ISL) 155 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Ireland (IRL) 76.5 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.4
Italy (ITA) 74.2 25.2 23.8 22.7 21.3 20.2 19.8
Malta (MLT) 49.5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Netherlands (NLD) 95.1 6.3 6.1 6.0 5.8 5.6 5.5
Norway (NOR) 125 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6
Portugal (PRT) 52.5 4.3 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.6
Sweden (SWE) 113 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.1 3.1
Spain (ESP) 61.6 16.5 16.1 15.6 14.8 14.3 14.7
Turkey (TUR) 27.8 19.8 21.6 22.5 23.0 23.6 24.1
United Kingdom (GBR) 86.2 25.3 23.8 22.9 21.8 20.9 20.4
Asia
China (CHN) 3.7 429.5 442 455 453 448 441
Korea (KOR) 32.6 16.6 17.2 17.2 16.9 16.7 16.3
India (IND) 4.7 295 322 340 350 360 370
Indonesia (IDN) 6.9 63.9 68.5 71.4 72.4 73.1 74.6
Japan (JPN) 106 51.6 50.8 49.5 47.1 45.0 43.2
Malaysia (MYS) 22.5 5.9 6.6 7.3 7.7 8.2 8.7
Pakistan (PAK) 6.6 35.0 39.8 43.3 46.0 48.9 52.7
Philippines (PHL) 14.2 20.5 23.1 25.0 26.3 27.5 28.9
Singapore (SGP) 65.6 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4
Sri Lanka (LKA) 8.9 6.5 6.7 6.9 6.8 6.6 6.7
Thailand (THA) 12.1 20.3 22.1 22.7 22.6 22.1 22.3
Vanuatu (VUT) 23.8 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Middle East
Bahrain (BHR) 102 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Oman (OMN) 51.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9
Egypt (EGY) 12.3 19.0 21.3 23.1 24.0 24.9 26.1
Israel (ISR) 88.8 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3
Jordan (JOR) 24.4 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.8
Saudi Arabia (SAU) 101 3.8 5.4 6.6 7.0 7.3 7.8
Syria (SYR) 16.3 3.8 4.5 5.1 5.5 5.9 6.5
Oceania
Australia (AUS) 88.0 6.4 6.6 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9
Fiji (FJI) 29.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
New Zealand (NZL) 80.0 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Papua N. Guinea (PNG) 13.6 1.4 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1
Solomon Is. (SLB) 17.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
44Table 1. TFP and Population Inputs, 104-Country Model, USA = 100 (cont.)
AN 1980 N1985 N1990 N1995 N2000 N2005
South America & Caribbean
Argentina (ARG) 55.2 12.2 12.7 13.1 13.1 13.1 13.1
Bahamas (BHS) 105 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Bolivia (BOL) 18.7 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.1
Brazil (BRA) 29.5 52.1 57.2 59.9 60.7 61.7 63.0
Chile (CHL) 27.3 4.9 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.5
Colombia (COL) 22.5 11.7 12.6 13.3 13.7 14.1 14.5
Ecuador (ECU) 20.0 3.4 3.8 4.1 4.3 4.4 4.4
Guyana (GUY) 17.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Haiti (HTI) 14.0 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1
Jamaica (JAM) 37.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
Paraguay (PRY) 20.2 1.3 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.0
Peru (PER) 26.8 7.4 8.2 8.7 9.0 9.2 9.4
St. Kitts (KNA) 43.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Lucia (LCA) 34.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
St. Vincent (VCT) 27.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Uruguay (URY) 52.1 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1
Venezuela (VEN) 54.1 6.4 7.3 7.9 8.3 8.6 9.0
Africa
Algeria (DZA) 23.5 7.9 9.3 10.1 10.6 10.8 11.1
Benin (BEN) 7.9 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.7
Botswana (BWA) 19.0 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
Burkina Faso (BFA) 5.2 2.9 3.2 3.6 3.9 4.2 4.7
Burundi (BDI) 4.9 1.8 2.1 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.5
Cameroon (CMR) 12.9 3.8 4.4 4.9 5.3 5.6 6.0
Central Af. Rep. (CAF) 9.2 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4
Chad (TCD) 5.9 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.4
Congo (COG) 16.0 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2
Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 17.6 3.4 4.4 5.1 5.6 6.1 6.5
Gabon (GAB) 63.5 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Gambia (GMB) 9.9 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
Ghana (GHA) 6.6 4.7 5.5 6.0 6.5 6.9 7.4
Guinea (GIN) 8.4 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.0 3.1
Kenya (KEN) 9.0 6.8 8.3 9.4 10.3 11.1 12.0
Liberia (LBR) 15.1 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.0 1.1
Madagascar (MDG) 8.6 3.7 4.1 4.5 4.9 5.4 6.0
Malawi (MWI) 5.2 2.6 3.1 3.8 3.8 4.1 4.5
Mali (MLI) 7.1 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.3 3.5 3.9
Mauritania (MRT) 11.0 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0
Mauritius (MUS) 25.9 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Morocco (MAR) 16.0 8.3 9.2 9.7 9.9 10.1 10.2
Mozambique (MOZ) 5.7 5.2 5.6 5.4 6.0 6.4 6.9
Niger (NER) 7.1 2.4 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.9 4.5
Nigeria (NGA) 8.4 30.1 34.3 37.8 40.9 44.2 47.8
Rwanda (RWA) 6.7 2.2 2.6 2.9 2.0 2.8 3.0
Senegal (SEN) 11.0 2.4 2.7 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.8
Seychelles (SYC) 56.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sierra Leone (SLE) 7.6 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.7
South Africa (ZAF) 33.5 11.8 13.2 14.1 14.7 15.6 15.9
Sudan (SDN) 7.2 8.6 10.1 10.9 11.6 12.4 13.1
Swaziland (SWZ) 15.6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4
Togo (TGO) 8.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.0
Tunisia (TUN) 19.5 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4
Zambia (ZMB) 10.9 2.4 2.9 3.2 3.4 3.7 4.0
Zimbabwe (ZWE) 11.6 3.1 3.7 4.2 4.4 4.4 4.2
45Table 2. Degree of Openness   and Periods Portfolio is Constrained Tc,1 0 4 - C o u n t r yM o d e l
 1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015 Tc
North & Central America
United States (USA) 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.86 0.86 0.86 0
Canada (CAN) 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.75 0.75 0.75 0
Costa Rica (CRI) 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.59 0.59 6
Dominican Republic (DOM) 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.58 0.58 0.58 3
El Salvador (SLV) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.56 0.56 0.56 4
Guatemala (GTM) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 6
Honduras (HND) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.56 0.56 7
Mexico (MEX) 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.69 0.73 0.73 0.73 3
Panama (PAN) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.58 0.58 0.58 1
Europe
Austria (AUT) 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.71 0.71 0
Belgium-Luxembourg (BEL) 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.82 0.82 0.82 4
Cyprus (CYP) 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.57 0.57 0.57 4
Denmark (DNK) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.67 0.67 0.67 0
Finland (FIN) 0.52 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.72 0.62 0.62 0
France (FRA) 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.78 0
Germany (DEU) 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.78 0.74 0.74 0
Iceland (ISL) 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.50 0.58 0
Ireland (IRL) 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.66 0.66 0.66 0
Italy (ITA) 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.70 0
Malta (MLT) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.54 0.54 0.54 0
Netherlands (NLD) 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.77 0.68 0.75 0
Norway (NOR) 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.64 0.64 0
Portugal (PRT) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.65 0.63 0.63 0
Sweden (SWE) 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.76 0.72 0.72 0
Spain (ESP) 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.72 0.72 0.72 0
Turkey (TUR) 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.65 0.65 7
United Kingdom (GBR) 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.78 0
Asia
China (CHN) 0.34 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 4
Korea (KOR) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.63 0.63 0.63 1
India (IND) 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.67 0.67 4
Indonesia (IDN) 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.57 3
Japan (JPN) 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.68 0.70 0.71 0
Malaysia (MYS) 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63 0
Pakistan (PAK) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.61 0.61 6
Philippines (PHL) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.61 3
Singapore (SGP) 0.62 0.63 0.63 0.66 0.74 0.92 0.92 0.92 8
Sri Lanka (LKA) 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.52 6
Thailand (THA) 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.63 0.63 0.63 2
Vanuatu (VUT) 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 7
Middle East
Bahrain (BHR) 0.26 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0
Oman (OMN) 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.56 0.56 4
Egypt (EGY) 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.66 5
Israel (ISR) 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.66 0.66 1
Jordan (JOR) 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.60 0.60 6
Saudi Arabia (SAU) 0.57 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 1
Syria (SYR) 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 7
Oceania
Australia (AUS) 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.70 0
Fiji (FJI) 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.52 0.52 5
New Zealand (NZL) 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.64 0
Papua N. Guinea (PNG) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 7
Solomon Is. (SLB) 0.44 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.26 6
46Table 2. Degree of Openness   and Periods Portfolio is Constrained Tc,1 0 4 - C o u n t r yM o d e l( c o n t . )
 1980  1985  1990  1995  2000  2005  2010  2015 Tc
South America & Caribbean
Argentina (ARG) 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.72 0.68 0.68 3
Bahamas (BHS) 0.50 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.55 0.55 7
Bolivia (BOL) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.65 0.56 0.56 5
Brazil (BRA) 0.68 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.77 0.73 0.73 3
Chile (CHL) 0.56 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.65 0.65 0.65 3
Colombia (COL) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.64 0.65 0.65 5
Ecuador (ECU) 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.63 0.58 0.58 3
Guyana (GUY) 0.23 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0
Haiti (HTI) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 7
Jamaica (JAM) 0.27 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 5
Paraguay (PRY) 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 7
Peru (PER) 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62 3
St. Kitts (KNA) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.63 0.63 0.86 0.86 0.86 3
St. Lucia (LCA) 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.65 4
St. Vincent (VCT) 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.45 5
Uruguay (URY) 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.60 0
Venezuela (VEN) 0.53 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.66 0.69 0.65 0.65 2
Africa
Algeria (DZA) 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.60 5
Benin (BEN) 0.41 0.30 0.30 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 7
Botswana (BWA) 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0
Burkina Faso (BFA) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.50 7
Burundi (BDI) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 7
Cameroon (CMR) 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.54 7
Central Af. Rep. (CAF) 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 7
Chad (TCD) 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.55 0.55 7
Congo (COG) 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.55 0.55 0.55 7
Cote d’Ivoire (CIV) 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 7
Gabon (GAB) 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.52 3
Gambia (GMB) 0.42 0.40 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.37 8
Ghana (GHA) 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.54 0.54 7
Guinea (GIN) 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.50 7
Kenya (KEN) 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.53 0.53 7
Liberia (LBR) 0.52 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 2
Madagascar (MDG) 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.58 7
Malawi (MWI) 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.47 0.47 7
Mali (MLI) 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.50 0.51 5
Mauritania (MRT) 0.48 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.33 0.42 0.42 7
Mauritius (MUS) 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.48 0.48 0.48 3
Morocco (MAR) 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.61 0.61 7
Mozambique (MOZ) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.54 0.54 0.54 7
Niger (NER) 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.48 7
Nigeria (NGA) 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.56 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.64 2
Rwanda (RWA) 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 7
Senegal (SEN) 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.50 7
Seychelles (SYC) 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.51 5
Sierra Leone (SLE) 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 6
South Africa (ZAF) 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 4
Sudan (SDN) 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.58 0.58 7
Swaziland (SWZ) 0.47 0.40 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0
Togo (TGO) 0.50 0.40 0.34 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.28 5
Tunisia (TUN) 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.58 1
Zambia (ZMB) 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.55 0.57 5
Zimbabwe (ZWE) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 4
47Table 3. Model Constants at Annual Rates
Parameter Expression Value
Preferences
Discount factor   .98
Leisure weight   1.32
Growth Rates (%)
Population  N 1.0
Technology  A 1.2
Income Shares (%)
Technology capital   7.0
Tangible capital (1    ) T 21.4
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital (1    ) I 6.5
Labor (1    )(1  T  I)6 5 . 1
Depreciation Rates (%)
Technology capital  M 8.0
Tangible capital  T 6.0
Plant-speciﬁc intangible capital  I 0
Tax Rates (%)
Labor wedge  li 34
Proﬁts  pi 37
Dividends  d 28
Note: See McGrattan and Prescott (2010) for details on these parameter choices.
48Table 4. Impact of FDI on Per Capita GDP Growth
Regression: g = a0 + a1 gdp0 + a2 fdi/gdp
g =a n n u a lg r o w t hi nr e a lG D Pp e rc a p i t ar e l a t i v et oU . S . ,1 9 8 0 – 2005 (U.S. = 0)
gdp0 =r e a lG D Pp e rc a p i t ar e l a t i v et oU . S .i n1 9 8 0( U . S .=1 )
fdi/gdp =a v e r a g er a t i oo fF D It oG D P( i np e r c e n t a g e s ) ,1 9 8 0 – 2 0 0 5
Coe cient
a0 a1 a2
Data  1.062 1.065 0.052
(.288) (.660) (.063)
Model  0.209 0.174 0.046
(.123) (.264) (.026)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
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